Wayne Lancelot Clarke v. Attorney General USA by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-23-2014 
Wayne Lancelot Clarke v. Attorney General USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Wayne Lancelot Clarke v. Attorney General USA" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 618. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/618 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 1 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4390 
___________ 
 
WAYNE LANCELOT CLARKE, 
 a/k/a WAYNE CLARKE, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                   Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-445-084) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew R. Arthur 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 20, 2014 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 23, 2014 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Wayne Lancelot Clarke (“Clarke”) petitions for review of the decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals  (“Board”) denying his application for deferral of removal 
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under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the reasons that follow, we will 
deny the petition for review. 
I. 
Clarke, a native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States on a tourist visa 
in 2002.  In late 2012, he received a notice to appear charging him with removability 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) as a nonimmigrant who entered the United States 
and remained longer than permitted, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien 
convicted of controlled substance violations, and pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) as 
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.  During Clarke’s immigration hearing, in 
which he participated pro se,
1
 he conceded removability on all charges but sought 
deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Clarke argued that, 
prior to leaving Jamaica, he had been a police officer and had arrested and shot several 
politically-connected gang members.  He claimed that in both Jamaica and the United 
States he and members of his family had received threats from people claiming to be 
friends of the people he arrested and shot. 
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that Clarke was ineligible for asylum or 
withholding of removal because his prior drug conviction constituted a particularly 
                                              
1
 The Immigration Judge informed Clarke of his right to counsel, sent Clarke a list 
of affordable and pro bono attorneys and legal advisors, and gave Clarke two 
continuances to find counsel.  See Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that an immigration judge’s failure to “advise the respondent of the availability 
of free legal services and to ascertain that the respondent has received a list of such 
programs” invalidates a subsequently entered removal order) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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serious crime.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  The IJ then 
reviewed Clarke’s evidence of political corruption, including the influence of gangs on 
public officials, but found that the Jamaican government has made progress in rooting out 
police corruption.  The IJ additionally found that Clarke had received protection from a 
fellow police officer while he still resided in Jamaica, and that he might receive 
protection should he return to Jamaica.  The IJ concluded that Clarke failed to show that 
it was more likely than not that he would be subject to torture by or at the instigation of, 
or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity if he were to be returned to Jamaica.  Accordingly, the IJ ordered 
Clarke’s removal to Jamaica. 
Clarke appealed the IJ’s CAT determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“the Board”), and also argued that the IJ had violated his due process rights by 
interrogating him with over 250 questions, some of which interrupted his testimony.
2
  
The Board determined that the IJ had a duty to develop the record by asking Clarke a 
number of questions, especially in light of the fact that Clarke was not represented by 
counsel.  The Board also found that the Jamaican government was seeking to protect 
retired officers by, among other things, deploying additional security when necessary.  
The Board then concluded that Clarke had neither suffered a due process violation nor 
demonstrated a clear probability of torture by or at the instigation of, or with the consent 
                                              
2
 Clarke did not contest the IJ’s determination that he had been convicted of an 
aggravated felony and particularly serious crime. 
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or acquiescence of, the Jamaican government.  On those grounds, the Board dismissed 
Clarke’s appeal. 
Clarke petitions for review. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and review only the Board’s 
disposition except to the extent that the Board’s order defers to the IJ’s ruling.  See 
Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010).  In a case where the petitioner’s 
removal order is based on a conviction for a controlled substance offense or aggravated 
felony, our jurisdiction is limited to the review of constitutional claims and questions of 
law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 
2012).   
Clarke has conceded that he was convicted of a controlled substance offense and 
aggravated felony, but argues that the IJ violated his due process rights by interrupting 
his testimony with more than 250 questions.  This is a constitutional claim over which we 
have jurisdiction.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  To establish a due process violation, 
Clarke “must show that he was denied a full and fair hearing, which includes a neutral 
and impartial arbiter of the merits of his claim and a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence on his behalf.”  Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “The Due Process Clause does not allow a neutral 
hearing officer to become the functional equivalent of counsel for one of the parties . . . .”  
Id. at 208.  Here, Clarke asserts that the IJ asked him more than 250 questions, 
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interrupted his testimony, and exhibited bias in favor of the Government.  However, in 
light of the fact that Clarke appeared pro se at his removal hearing, we agree with the 
Board that the IJ’s questions were necessary to develop the record and did not obstruct 
Clarke’s ability to testify.  See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 596-97 (3d Cir. 
2003).  The record does not show that the IJ lacked courtesy or acted unprofessionally 
towards Clarke, see id. at 597, nor does it indicate that the IJ took over the Government’s 
cross-examination for any purpose other than to clarify details for the record, cf. 
Abulashvili at 207-08.  Clarke’s due process claim is therefore meritless.   
Clarke also claims that the IJ and Board applied an incorrect legal standard to his 
CAT claim.  This, too, is a question of law over which we have jurisdiction.  See 
Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2011).  To be eligible 
for CAT relief, an alien must show that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if 
removed to the country in question.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  “Torture” consists of the 
intentional infliction of “severe pain or suffering . . . by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  An alien need not show that the government possesses actual 
knowledge of torturous conduct; rather, he can establish governmental acquiescence to 
torture by demonstrating that the government is willfully blind to the perpetrator’s 
activities.  Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 69 (3d Cir. 2007).  Here, the Board 
assessed whether Clarke demonstrated “a clear probability of torture by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of the Jamaican government (to include 
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the concept of willful blindness),” and concluded that he had not.  Because this standard 
is consistent with Silva-Rengifo, there is no merit to Clarke’s claim that the IJ and Board 
applied an incorrect legal standard.  
Clarke also asserts that the IJ and Board failed to address evidence of the Jamaican 
government’s willful blindness.  This issue is within our jurisdiction.  See Huang, 620 
F.3d at 388.  While the Board “must provide sufficient analysis to demonstrate that it has 
truly performed a full review of the record,”3 id., the Board “need not discuss every piece 
of evidence mentioned by an asylum applicant,” see Green at 509.  Here, the Board 
reviewed the record, including all documentation submitted by Clarke, and found that the 
Jamaican government has made efforts to protect retired police officers.  On that basis, 
the Board concluded that Clarke had not demonstrated a clear probability of torture.  This 
is therefore not a case where the Board can be said to have ignored Clarke’s favorable 
evidence.  See Green at 509.   
However, to the extent that his third claim is, in substance, a challenge to the 
Board’s weighing of the evidence and conclusion that the Jamaican government would 
not be willfully blind to his torture, those are factual issues that we lack jurisdiction to 
review.  See id. at 507-08;  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2010).   
                                              
3
 In Huang, this Court emphasized that the Board’s review “must reflect a 
meaningful consideration of the record as a whole” when the Board reaches a different 
conclusion than the IJ.  620 F.3d at 387.  That is not the case here, as the Board upheld 
the IJ’s conclusion.    
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Finally, because Clarke failed to appeal to the Board the IJ’s determination that he 
had been convicted of a particularly serious crime, he did not preserve that issue for our 
review.  See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
